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Abstract: The research explored the role of political leadership in response to the
novel coronavirus (COVID-19). The researchers conducted a political discourse
analysis on 239 transcripts from the press briefings of President Trump and seven U.
S. governors to determine the extent to which the research subjects used effective
crisis leadership and communication. These results suggest that President Trump
and Governors DeSantis, DeWine, Ducey, and Ivey are particularly vulnerable to
political fallout for their handling of COVID-19 because stakeholders might view
them as inattentive to the crisis and ineffective in their policy responses. Governors
Cuomo, Newsom, and Whitmer may be in a better position to avoid fallout due to
their information-seeking, hands-on approaches, which some will deem as compe
tent and appropriate to the threat (although others may see their efforts as overcontrolling). The research demonstrated how discourse analysis could predict poli
tical behaviors and blame assignment for crisis responses.
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Political leaders have a duty and primary respon
sibility for using governmental resources and
communication channels to protect their consti
tuents. Coordinated leadership at federal, state,
and local levels is critical to ensure that resources
are distributed, and that information is available
for people to make informed decisions.
Presidential and gubernatorial leadership plays a
critical role in U.S. public policy decisions that
have life and death consequences for Americans.
Politics can play a role in crisis communication
and response. We mapped political leadership
style to political behaviors and potential for poli
tical fallout. We analyzed press briefings to see
how each leader’s style tracked to their crisis
response.
Crisis leadership is an essential component of a
robust governance structure that would enable
resilience. This research demonstrated that dis
course analysis of political leaders’ press-briefings
could predict their response patterns and political
fallout based on stakeholder perceptions. This
finding is important because politicians play a
crucial leadership role in disaster response,
resource allocation, public perception, and devel
opment of resilient systems.
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1. Introduction
On 22 January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) briefed reporters about the emerging
outbreak of a novel coronavirus, COVID-19, that had originated in China’s Wuhan province in
December of 2019 (WHO, 2020b). On January 30, WHO declared COVID-19 a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), and on March 11, a global pandemic (WHO, 2020c,
2020d). In February, the WHO released a strategic response plan for the coronavirus that aimed to
limit transmission, care for patients, stop transmission from animals, learn how to fight the virus,
communicate facts, counter misinformation, and minimize the social and economic consequences
(WHO, 2020a).
Meanwhile, on January 31, Dr. Robert Redfield, Director of the U.S. Center for Disease Control
(CDC), addressed reporters as part of the president’s two-day-old Coronavirus Task Force (The
White House, 2020a). In his remarks, Dr. Redfield emphasized that the risk to the American public
was low. Nevertheless, the U.S. declared a public health emergency and began mandatory 14-day
quarantines for Americans arriving from China. On March 11, President Trump issued a
Proclamation barring foreign nationals who had visited China within the past two weeks from
entering the U.S. (The White House, 2020b).
On March 29, President Trump blamed China for patterns of misconduct, including numerous
trade violations, covering up the severity of coronavirus, pressuring WHO, stealing trade secrets,
and violating treaty obligations with the U.K. over Hong Kong (The White House, 2020c). Reporters
criticized the president, charging that he wasted precious time debating and playing down the
presence of a pandemic, ordered the dismantling of early warning systems, attempted to defund
the CDC, and ignored assessments from intelligence agencies (Douclef, 2018; Poznansky, 2020;
Sun, 2018). These assertions were bolstered by Obama-era officials who charged that Trump and
his aides seemed inattentive and disinterested during turnover briefings on the H9N2 virus and
said that the incoming Trump administration downplayed the likelihood or potential threat for
future novel coronaviruses (Toosi et al., 2020).
In 2019, a panel of international experts assembled under the Nuclear Threat Institute and the
John Hopkins Center for Health Security to develop a threat index for countries’ preparedness for a
significant biological threat (Nuclear Threat Initiative & John Hopkins Center for Health Security,
2019). The resulting Global Health Security Index (GHSI) ranked member organizations of the WHO
in order of their infrastructure and apparent readiness in six areas (a) prevention, (b) detection and
reporting, (c) rapid response, (d) health system, (e) compliance with international norms, and (f)
risk environment. The U.S. ranked best, number 1 of 195 countries, although the report noted that
every country should improve its preparedness.
Only months after the report was published, the most significant global health crisis since the
1918 H1N1 Flu Pandemic (Fineberg, 2014; Hashim et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2014) would test the
report’s conclusions. In the ideal response, federal, state, and local officials would put aside
political and ideological differences to focus all resources and energy against the threat. Such a
coordinated response would be critical in the case of a highly infectious, novel disease that has no
known treatments, vaccines, or cures.
Instead, the U.S. federal government’s response to COVID-19 highlighted divisions within the
Coronavirus Task Force between politicians and scientists on the nature of the threat. Furthermore,
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federal and state responses exacerbated these divisions. The Trump administration differed with
governors over personal protective equipment, reporting, analytics, essential businesses and
services, and ultimate re-opening authority. The widening rift begs the question of whether leader
ship styles and crisis communication encouraged risky behavior that will prolong the pandemic,
ultimately compromising U.S. resilience through the politicization of the pandemic response.

2. Literature review
A considerable amount of literature addresses general leadership. For an exhaustive review,
readers can turn to Bass and Stogdill’s comprehensive Handbook of Leadership (Bass & Stogdill,
1990) or the Center for Creative Leadership’s more contemporary Handbook of Leadership
Development (Van Velsor et al., 2010). Political leaders are responsible for protecting their con
stituents from harm and economic damage (Comfort et al., 2020; Kearns et al., 2019). The
phenomenon of political leadership relates to three broad areas of shaping policies, achieving
policy goals, and mobilizing support (Torfing et al., 2020, 2019). Crisis leadership relates to leader
ship within the context of a crisis (Boin, 2009; Liu et al., 2020). This review synthesizes the literature
on political leadership and crisis leadership.

2.1. Political leadership
Four philosophical traditions form the foundation of Western political leadership ideology: Greek
and Roman philosophies, Christian theology and philosophy, Social Contract Theory, and
Representative Government Theory (Parrish, 2010). These four traditions have commonalities
related to the belief that democratic societies must have individuals who rise to political leader
ship; however, essential differences create an underlying tension that affects current political
leadership concepts. The tension relates to concepts of elitism and equality. Political leadership
is necessary either because people are not capable of self-rule or necessary because they are
capable of self-rule. In the first case, elites must take the reins of political leadership because they
have the intelligence, the financial resources, and the character to guide the masses (Keller, 1963).
It follows that political leaders must exercise their authority in the interest of what they deem best
for the people. In the second case, people cede self-rule to achieve the common good—robust
democratic processes are essential to check the excesses and prevent the inevitable abuses of
power. The political leader must balance their values and political beliefs with their duty to fulfill
the will of the people. Political leaders actions will reflect that, ultimately, people will have an
opportunity to reject their sovereignty through the ballot box.
Political leaders have a moral duty to serve their constituents through upholding values, enact
ing legislation, and ensuring public safety (Couto, 2010; French, 2011; Kearns et al., 2019; Smith et
al., 2007). Scholars have advanced different types of political leadership. For example, democratic
political leadership honors the pure democratic traditions of collaborative decision-making and
policymaking (Couto, 2010; Sørensen & Torfing, 2019). Vanguard political leadership refers to
fringe political groups, usually consisting of intellectuals and activists, that work to overthrow
the dominant groups (Marcy, 2020).
Robert Dahl, an influential 20th-century theorist of democracy, coined the term polyarchy,
referring to the democratic governance of large, complex societies (Keohane, 2015). Within a
polyarchy, citizens control the political agenda, have recurring opportunities to accept or reject
their representatives, require free access to information, and demand political equality. Dahl’s
early writing depicted political leaders as controlled by the people; however, he evolved to believe
that political leaders developed unusual influence compared to other people (Dahl, as cited in
Keohane, 2015). An essential distinction of Dahl’s concept of exceptionalism was that political
leaders’ exceptionalism derived from the intense learning they accomplished as they took on
increasingly responsible political leadership positions (Keohane, 2015).
In marked contrast, Max Weber argued that an optimal political leader is a virtuous person
willing to act corruptly to achieve certain ends and maintain an illusion of control (Weber, as cited
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in Parrish, 2010). Only such a virtuous person would act with restraint, given the potential to abuse
power. Weber observed that successful politicians must build and control political machines
capable of inspiring followers and wielding power to its ultimate end of violence.
Joseph Schumpeter identified two primary threats to representative government, incompetence
or interests misaligned with the general community welfare. (Schumpeter, as cited in Mackie,
2009). He rejected the idea that a political leader could be elected only to carry out the common
good and the will of the people, arguing that there is no such thing as a common good or the
people’s will since individuals have different needs and desires (Schumpeter, 2008). Therefore, the
electorate’s primary role must be to elect (or evict) a government, and secondarily that the elected
represent its many interests. Schumpeter (2008) described four conditions necessary for the
success of the democratic method: (a) competent individuals of “adequate ability and moral
character” (p. 290) willing to serve the political machinery, (b) limitations to the real power of
government (possibly in the form of checks and balance or electoral limits), (c) a competent
bureaucracy with some independence to run the government bureaucracy, and (d) democratic
self-control. “Politicians in parliament must resist the temptation to upset or embarrass the
government each time they coud do so. No successful policy is possible if they do this”
(Schumpeter, 2008, p. 295).
Garzia (2011) reviewed the personalization of politics in Western democracies. Politics have
moved away from political parties and symbols towards an emphasis on political leaders’ person
alities. The evolution results from technological innovations in media and changes in political
parties’ structures due to the declining role of ideology in voter decision-making. Constant atten
tion on political leaders has stripped voters’ idealized conceptions in favor of a desire to identify
with the leader. To remain relevant, parties cater to voters by emphasizing the candidates’
characteristics instead of party principles and ideologies.
From the constellation of general leadership traits (for an exhaustive list, see Bass & Stogdill,
1990), voters judge candidates on a subset of attributes such as competence, leadership, integrity,
and empathy (Kinder as cited in Garzia, 2011). Voters consistently rank honesty as the most critical
individual trait. Yet, national contests in the U.S., Germany, and Italy demonstrated that candi
dates deemed dishonest could win national elections (Garzia, 2011).
Decision-making by political leaders is relevant to the current study. Keller and Yang (2008)
applied the poliheuristic theory of decision-making to political leaders. Poliheuristic decision-mak
ing theories attempt to integrate cognitive and rational approaches. Political leaders exercise two
stages of decision-making. In the first noncompensatory stage, leaders apply the cognitive domain
by considering their preferred choice’s political feasibility as the main factor in decision making. In
the second rational stage, they turn to cost-benefit analysis to execute a comparison of options.
The research demonstrated that political leaders discount their constituents’ perspectives in the
face of provocation. This finding suggests that leaders believed that situational variables such as
being provoked or involved in a crisis gave them license to follow their instincts rather than the
constituents’ will. Men were significantly more likely than women to ignore their constituents’
preferences.
The preceding may help to explain why scholars have also found that constituents tend to be
dissatisfied with their political representation, except in times of collective grief or security, such as
after 9/11 (Smith et al., 2007; Sørensen & Torfing, 2019). The research demonstrated that positive
outcomes did not drive constituent satisfaction (Smith et al., 2007). Instead, people were more
satisfied with politicians when they deemed that decision-making processes were sufficient,
collaborative, and representative of diverse perspectives. Moreover, other research has shown
that people appreciate leaders who they believe are sacrificing personally on behalf of the group’s
needs. People resent leaders who are selfish, arrogant, elitist, or self-aggrandizing. That disdain
feeds the personalization of politics discussed above (Garzia, 2011).
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2.2. Crisis leadership
A crisis is a “breakdown of familiar symbolic frameworks legitimating the pre-existing sociopolitical order” t’ Hart as cited in (Boin et al., 2010). In a crisis, leaders must recognize the
emerging threat, mitigate the problem, and deal with the consequences (Boin et al., 2010).
Leaders must make important decisions that will necessarily affect lives, and they must commu
nicate their decisions to a frightened and vulnerable public (Boin, 2009; Comfort et al., 2020;
Körösényi et al., 2016). In a crisis, leaders must cope with an enhanced threat, uncertainty
concerning actions that will mitigate the threat, and the urgency to act (Lawton, 2013). A crisis
raises the stakes of political leadership because the leader must develop an effective response to
the crisis to retain constituents’ support (Boin, 2009; Boin et al., 2010; Comfort et al., 2020;
Körösényi et al., 2016). Crisis leadership is “the process of leading group members through a
sudden and largely unanticipated, intensely negative, and emotionally draining circumstance”
DuBrin, as cited in (Liu et al., 2020, p. 128)

2.2.1. Crises frameworks
Much of the literature on crisis leadership frameworks pays particular attention to the organiza
tional perspective (Hermann, 1963; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Quarantelli, 1988). Some researchers
developed frameworks concerning the impact of international crises on political leadership
(Brecher, 1979; McClelland, 1977). A relatively small body of literature is concerned with crisis
leadership from the political leadership perspective, especially from the executive rather than
group perspective (Boin et al., 2010; Brändström et al., 2004; Rosenthal et al., 1991).
The following discussion relates to general crisis response frameworks proposed in the literature.
The most elementary crisis model, the three-stage model, breaks a crisis into three stages: (a) precrisis, (b) crisis, and (c) post-crisis (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). In the pre-crisis phase, a rising threat is
often minimized or misunderstood. The danger becomes increasingly likely during the incubation
or gestation period. The crisis stage begins with a trigger, sometimes sudden and dramatic, that
eventually causes people to recognize that a crisis has occurred. People often become emotionally
reactive and confused about what to do. Sometimes, the structure necessary to deal with the
problem collapses because it is unfit for the task. Self-organizing, emergent forces eventually deal
with the situation. The post-crisis phase begins when the crisis abates and a sense of order returns.
The post-crisis stage “is also a time of intense investigation and analysis that includes efforts to
create plausible explanations of what went wrong; why, how, who is to blame; and what should be
done to prevent future crises” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, p. 32).
Steven Fink developed a four-stage crisis model during his work leading the crisis team that
responded to the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania, US (Fink, 1986;
Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). Fink (1986) likened a crisis to stages of chronic disease: (a) prodromal, (b)
acute, (c) chronic, and (d) resolution. The prodromal phase of a disease refers to when symptoms
first occur before the outbreak of disease. During the prodromal stage, if people act quickly, there
may be time to stave off the crisis’s impending severity. During the acute stage, the problem has
fully erupted. Planning or actions taken during the prodromal stage may control critical elements
of the crisis such as flow, speed, direction, and duration. Responders use strategic communication
to control public actions. The chronic stage represents recovery, analysis, and healing. The chronic
stage can take years for people to get over the effects of the crisis. The final stage, recovery,
represents a return to normal or, at least, a new normal. Fink’s four-stage model has been applied
as an analytical tool (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).
Fink’s (1986) four-stage cycle was preceded by a decade by Barry Turner’s six-stage sequence of
failure in foresight (Turner, 1976). The six-stage crisis model included (a) a notionally normal
starting point, (b) an incubation period, (c) a precipitating event, (d) onset, (e) rescue and salvage,
and (f) full cultural readjustment. Because Turner was a sociologist, his model emphasized cultural
dimensions, social processes, and the organization as a complex system. Turner also focused
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heavily on the need to potentially create or recreate communication channels during a disaster
because existing channels are often inadequate or nonexistent.
Reynolds and Seeger (2005) described a Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model
that Reynolds and her colleagues had developed for the CDC after the anthrax scare and 9/11
terrorist attacks in 2001. The model included a five-stage crisis communication response model:
(a) pre-crisis stage consisting of risk messages, warnings, and preparations; (b) initial event,
consisting of uncertainty reduction, self-efficacy, and reassurance; (c) maintenance, consisting of
ongoing uncertainty reduction, self-efficacy, and reassurance; (d) resolution, consisting of resolu
tion updates, discussion about the cause, and new risks or new understandings about risk; and (e)
evaluation, which includes discussions of the adequacy of the response, consensus about lessons
learned, and new understandings of risks (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).

2.2.2. Crisis response
Much of the research into crisis response has focused on what individuals and groups should do
during a crisis or have modeled characteristics of crisis stages. Comfort et al. (2020) described four
components of an adaptive decision-making process that leaders consider during a crisis: (a)
cognition, (b) communication, (c) coordination, and (d) control. Cognition relates to the leader’s
ability to recognize the emerging risk and act on information to help the community.
Communication is a process of creating shared meaning that results in the effective dissemination
of information about the risk and the response. Coordination is the degree of interdependence and
alignment between relevant actors. Control relates to the effective response to the threat while
maintaining societal systems (e.g., social and economic activities).
Boin (2009) described five executive tasks for political leaders during a crisis that track with the
adaptive decision-making process suggested by Comfort et al. (2020):
(1) Preparing in the face of indifference.
(2) Making sense of emerging and evolving threats.
(3) Managing large response networks.
(4) Offering credible answers.
(5) Learning under pressure.
Preparation and sensemaking occur along with cognition. Managing response networks relates
to coordination. Offering credible answers is part of communication. Learning under pressure can
be seen as control because maintaining societal systems during a crisis would require learning.
Some scholars have observed that most governmental crisis response features centralized
decision-making in three areas: (a) power is concentrated in a few executives, (b) decisional
power becomes concentrated in governmental agencies, and (c) there is a desire for strong
leadership and crisis governance (‘t Hart et al., 1993). However, ‘t Hart et al. (1993) argued that
crisis conditions such as high threat, time exigency, and uncertainty made bureaucratic treatment
of a crisis infeasible.
Scholars also refer to structuralist or constructivist responses to exogenous crises such as
hurricanes, wildfire, flooding, and terrorism (Körösényi et al., 2016). The structuralist approach is
reactive because crisis brings about a change in the existing structure, necessitating a leader’s
reaction. Generally, leaders react by attempting to reduce uncertainty through the use of conven
tional crisis management tools. The political leaders view the crisis as an anomaly rather than a
systemic problem. The anemic reaction to Hurricane Katrina from multiple government levels
exemplifies the reactive nature of structuralist political leadership (Boin, 2009).
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Constructivists suggest that leaders leverage the crisis by constructing a narrative to shape the
desired response. In these cases, the political leaders see the crisis as a system failure. Thus, the
crisis becomes an opportunity to bring about systemic change. President Bush’s reaction to the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the U.S. is an example of constructivist political leadership. He used the
crisis to create the Department of Homeland Security, enact the Patriot Act, start the Global War
on Terror, and invade Iraq and Afghanistan (Kapucu, 2009; Körösényi et al., 2016).
Political leaders sometimes invent crises from endogenous circumstances to fit a narrative of
their choosing (Körösényi et al., 2016; Schnurr et al., 2015). Their motives in using these so-called
voluntaristic approaches are to bring about transformational or revolutionary change. These
political leaders intend to “question conventions and conventional authorities … to change the
balance of power, undermine their rivals’ structural position, rebuild institutions or exchange them
for new ones” (Körösényi et al., 2016, p. 99). President Trump’s assertion that the 2020 U.S.
Presidential Election was stolen is representative of the voluntaristic political leadership approach
(Hart, 2020; Jacobson, 2020). Trump started a false narrative that the presidential election would
only be fair if he won before the first votes were cast (Jacobson, 2020). He continued to perpetuate
the story before, during, and after the election. The continuous drip of false and misleading
information galvanized tens of millions of people to believe and support the false claims because
those supporters believed that the institutions he attacked were corrupt. The deception was
successful, but Trump’s strategy to overturn the election failed to bring about the revolutionary
change he sought.
Hermann (1979) presented a comprehensive list of stress indicators in policymakers during
foreign policy crises. Not all policymakers experienced stress during a crisis, and some stresses
extended beyond the executive to other individuals, groups, and organizations. Indicators of a
stress reaction included verbal and nonverbal indicators (e.g., flustered or rapid speech, eyeblinks,
irritability, vigilance, changes in voice quality). General coping behaviors included contending
(fight), avoidance (flight), and inaction.

2.2.3. Transboundary crises
According to Boin (2009), in a transboundary crisis, “the functioning of multiple, life-sustaining
systems, functions, or infrastructures is acutely threatened, and the causes of failure or courses of
redress remain unclear” (p. 368). Transboundary crises may cross geopolitical lines in addition to
functional and temporal boundaries. Thus, it is difficult to discern why, where, or when a trans
boundary crisis started and who should be responsible for ending the crisis. Therefore, transbound
ary crises present a challenge for political leaders because they might not know the what issues to
address, how to address them, or whether they should be primarily responsible. Furthermore, there
might not be systems in place to respond to or learn from a transboundary crisis, there will likely
have been no training or communication networks created to address the specific challenges,
leaders may have no understanding of the complexity of the crisis, and leaders may not have the
capacity to organize an effective response to cover all of the affected boundaries. Finally, political
leaders must maintain transparency in providing accurate and accessible informaition to generate
public and political support for their actions.
The world is becoming more susceptible to transboundary crises due to globalization, technolo
gical advances, modernization, climate change, terrorism, and economic inequality (Boin, 2009;
Hannah et al., 2009; Lawton, 2013). Hannah et al. (2009) advanced a leadership framework for
extreme contexts, recognizing that there might be no greater need for leadership than in extreme
contexts. Hannah et al. (2009) differentiate crisis as a more general term than extreme on four
accounts. First, the threat in an extreme event or context must reach the level of intolerable
magnitude, which by its nature might bring about different leader and follower responses. For
example, in an extreme context, followers might be willing to risk their lives in a way not thinkable
during a crisis. Second, definitions of crisis include urgency of action, whereas extreme situations
may be ongoing (e.g., wartime operations). Third, crises may be lower probability occurrences than
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extreme events. Consider the example of paramedic first responders who deal daily with extreme
events. Lastly, extreme events may not be ambiguous and uncertain, as in the case of crises.
Nevertheless, some crises, such as pandemics and natural disasters, do reach the level of
extreme events and extreme contexts. Hannah et al. (2009) The proposed framework suggests
that leaders need to be aware of defining factors such as location in time, the magnitude and
probability of consequences, physical or psycho-social proximity, and the form of the threat.
According to the framework, the factors are attenuated by psychological, social, and organiza
tional resources and attenuated by time and complexity. These considerations appear relevant to
the political leadership of transboundary crises.
We now turn to the theoretical framework for the current study.

3. Theoretical framework
Destabilizing events increasingly bring about intense politicization of the events and the responses
(Boin et al., 2010). Leaders become concerned about whom stakeholders will blame and hold
accountable for the events. Furthermore, elected leaders might assess how their decisions and
actions will affect their electability. The closer to an election, the more likely political calculus will
influence the leaders’ decision-making. Boin et al. (2010) argued that politicians worry about the
political fallout for crisis outcomes during a crisis.
Whether elected leaders survive politically may depend on (a) the extent of blame they receive
from the press, politicians, and formal investigations; and (b) how well they manage fallout both
during the crisis and while responding to the scrutiny. Therefore, it becomes of primary importance
to understand how leaders will act in these circumstances. As previously discussed, political
leaders have a primary responsibility to serve their constituents and keep them from harm. If
political leaders elevate their political fortunes over their constituents’ safety, they fail their
primary democratic leadership responsibility.
Boin et al. (2010) examined the crisis response and subsequent political fallout and blame
assignment after Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast of the United States. The authors adopted a
political leadership framework from Hermann et al. (2001) into a framework for understanding the
implications of potential blame on leadership style during a crisis (see Table 1).
The Boin et al. (2010) framework has two axes, (a) the need for control and personal involve
ment on the horizontal axis and (b) leader sensitivity to context on the vertical axis. Political
leadership styles predict the leader’s vulnerability to political fallout and how constituents will
judge their competence (Boin et al., 2010). The combination of political and crisis leadership in a
single framework is unique within the literature. Furthermore, the framework provides a lens to
examine a political leader’s crisis behavior. Thus, the framework facilitates key elements of our
research agenda, as explicated in the conceptual framework section.

3.1. Need for control
When leaders have a high need for power, they are likely to be hands-on, attempt to exert more
control over a situation, and be more invested in the outcome. During a crisis, high control leaders
demand to be at the center of decisions and processes. By contrast, low control leaders are handsoff, preferring to delegate all but the most critical decisions to trusted subordinates.

3.2. Sensitivity to context
Leaders may have a high or low sensitivity to context. Leaders with high sensitivity for context
need extensive information before they make decisions. Thus, they are likely to seek input from a
diverse set of advisors; they are more likely to understand nuanced policy contexts and perspec
tives. Leaders with low sensitivity to context do not need much information, may not seed advice,
and often are seen as decisive decision-makers.
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Table 1. Leadership style, crisis behavior, and blame implications
Leader
sensitivity
to context

Need for control and personal involvement
High

Low

High

Seen as more “hands-on” and engaged in
handling crisis (little delegation to staff)
Seen as more “competent” due to limited
visible bureau-political conflict
Seen as more “responsive” to the situation
due to willingness to consider alternative
viewpoints, broad search for feedback, and
emphasis on expertise over loyalty in staff
Seen as “slow or tentative” in response to
situation due to high need and broad
search for information when making
decisions
Mixed vulnerability when crisis has a rapid
onset (“fast-burning” or “long-shadow”
crises). Less vulnerable due to high
personal engagement. More vulnerable
due to slow decision process and high
need for information
Low vulnerability to slow-building crises
(like “cathartic” or “slow-burning”),
especially if situation complex and
characterized by substantial ambiguity

Seen as more’ detached and uninvolved’ in
handling crisis (substantial delegation to
staff)
Seen as less “competent” due to visible
bureau-political conflict and slow decision
process
Seen as more “responsive” to the situation
due to willingness to consider alternative
viewpoints, broad search for feedback, and
emphasis on expertise over loyalty in staff
Seen as “slow or tentative” in response to
situation due to high need and broad
search for information when making
decisions
High vulnerability to rapid-onset crises
(“fast-burning” or “long-shadow” crises)
due to limited personal engagement,
delegation, and slow decision process
resulting from high information needs
Low vulnerability to slow-building crises
(like “cathartic” or “slow-burning”),
especially if situation complex and
characterized by substantial ambiguity

Low

Seen as more “hands-on” and engaged in
handling crisis (moderate delegation to
staff)
Seen as moderately “competent” due to
rapid, decisive decision style, but visible
bureau-political conflict
Seen as more “unresponsive” to the
situation due to unwillingness to consider
alternative viewpoints, limited search for
feedback, and emphasis on loyalty over
expertise in staff
Seen as “more decisive” in response to
situation due to low need for information
when making decisions
Mixed vulnerability when crisis has a rapid
onset (“fast-burning” or “long-shadow”
crises). Less vulnerable due to high
personal engagement. More vulnerable
due to general inattentiveness to policy
environment increases likelihood they will
be caught unawares or unprepared
High vulnerability to slow-building crises
(like “cathartic” or “slow-burning”),
especially if complex and characterized by
substantial ambiguity due to insensitivity
to context

Seen as “detached and uninvolved” in
handling crisis (substantial delegation to
staff)
Seen as “incompetent” due to highly visible
bureaucratic infighting and conflict over
policy, plus limited personal engagement
which slows down decision making.
Seen as more “unresponsive” to the
situation due to unwillingness to consider
alternative viewpoints, limited search for
feedback, and emphasis on loyalty over
expertise in staff
Seen as “generally decisive” in response to
situation due to low need for information
when making decisions, but limited
personal engagement results in “reactive”
style
High vulnerability to crisis with rapid onset
(“fast-burning” or “long-shadow” crises)
due to low need for personal engagement.
If situation has low ambiguity, may
respond well. However, if ambiguous, low
sensitivity to context often leads to
inappropriate policy responses
Highly vulnerability to slowly developing
crises (like “cathartic” or ‘slow-burning)
due to general inattentiveness to policy
environment increases likelihood they will
be caught unawares or unprepared

Note: This table describes the potential that blame will fall on a leader after a crisis, based on the leadership style of
the leader. Adapted from Boin et al. (2010). Leadership style, crisis response and blame management: The case of
Hurricane Katrina. Public Administration, 88(3), 706–723. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01836.x.
Reproduced with permission from Wiley.
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4. Research method
4.1. Purpose statement
In today’s political climate, political leaders must protect their constituents and, arguably, extend
their circles of concern to consider global constituents. Since pandemics are global and existential
concerns, by definition, politicians must put public welfare above their personal and political
fortunes. As of 12 June 2020, the CDC reported 134,572 deaths and 3,236,130 cases of COVID19 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020a). Forecasts for total deaths have continued
to increase (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020b, 2020c) even while the federal
government seeks to open schools and businesses.
Political scholars have theorized responses to pandemics that would serve to minimize death and
suffering based on ideals of communication transparency, adherence to scientific evidence, and decisive
public policy. The question remains of the extent to which U.S. politicians are following a script that will
save Americans or if they are attempting to bolster their political opportunities. The purpose of the
current research is to identify crisis and pandemic leadership themes from COVID-19 press briefings of U.
S. presidential and gubernatorial leaders, based on the following research questions:
(1) What themes did President Trump use in his COVID-19 press briefings?
(2) What themes did the sample of Governors use in their COVID-19 press briefings?
(3) Do RQ1 and RQ2 themes map to the theoretical framework?

4.2. Selection of subjects
Federal, state, and local agencies typically mount coordinated responses through sharing information,
resources, personal protective equipment, and emergency personnel. Ideally, we would have included
governors from every state and territory for this research. However, it was necessary to limit the
governors to a smaller number for the sake of time and researcher bandwidth. We chose this sample
of governors to ensure broad demographic coverage of political party affiliation, gender, and state size.
We made this selection at the start of this research in March of 2020. The selection created some
methodological challenges due to the wide disparity in the numbers of press briefings. At the start of
COVID-19, President Trump and Governor Cuomo held nearly daily press briefings. Governors Ivey and
Ducey have held only a few briefings. The remaining governors have held multiple briefings per week.
Table 2 lists the subjects for the current research, along with the political affiliation, gender, population,
and numbers of COVID-19 briefing transcripts. We sourced the transcripts for the governors from the
transcription website rev.com. We searched the site for each governor’s name using a search string (e.g.,
https://www.rev.com/blog/?s=Newsom). The transcripts for President Trump’s briefings come from www.
whitehouse.gov at the following link: https://www.whitehouse.gov/search/?s=Coronavirus±task±force
±briefings.

4.3. Method
Political scientists generally approach qualitative inquiry using rhetorical, discourse, or narrative analysis
(Wesley, 2014). Rhetorical analysis is appropriate for investigating how politicians deliver their messages
and the strategies they use to achieve their objectives. Discourse analysis focuses on the ideas behind the
message—the range of “values, norms, ideologies, and other contextual factors” (p. 137) transmitted
through politicians’ language. Finally, narrative analysis investigates “the content, origins, evolution, and
impact of the message as a ‘story’ about political life” (p. 139). The current research was concerned with
presidential and gubernatorial leadership in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Political discourse
analysis was appropriate because we were evaluating crisis leadership through the contextual factors of
whether the leader’s words and actions were consistent with the expected words and actions based on
the framework. Thus, while outcomes are important in terms of preservation of human life and avoidance
of suffering, outcomes do not necessarily demonstrate effective crisis leadership.
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President

Governor

Governor

Governor

Governor

Governor

Governor

Governor

Donald Trump

Andrew Cuomo

Gavin Newsom

Ron DeSantis

Mike DeWine

Gretchen Whitmer

Kay Ivey

Doug Ducey
a

Arizona

Alabama

Michigan

Ohio

Florida

California

New York

U.S.

Place

Republican

Republican

Democrat

Republican

Republican

Democrat

Democrat

Republican

Affiliation

male

female

female

male

male

male

male

male

Gender

7.4 million

4.9 million

10.0 million

11.7 million

21.9 million

39.9 million

19.4 million

331 million

Constituentsa,

b

b

1

3

20

30

31

42

56

56

Transcripts

Rev

Rev

Rev

Rev

Rev

Rev

Rev

WH

Source

Note: Number of interview transcripts = 239. U.S population data projected from the 2017 U.S. census data(World Population Review, 2020a). State population data projected from the 2019 World
Population Prospects (World Population Review, 2020b)

Position

Name

Table 2. Research subjects: Associated demographics, the source, and number of transcripts of press briefings from 17 March 2020, to 15 May 2020
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4.4. Research protocol
COVID-19 press briefing transcripts were retrieved from Rev.com and Whitehouse.gov for the
research subjects covering 27 February 2020, to 14 May 2020. This process resulted in 239 raw
transcripts for the eight subjects. The transcripts were downloaded using an NVivo feature that
captures a webpage in a PDF format, then imported and automatically coded to the case for each
subject, as appropriate. The cases were cleaned by deselecting text that did not belong to the
subject (i.e., was spoken by someone other than the subject or was identifying information about
the event). At the end of this step, each of the eight cases contained coding only for that individual.
NVivo’s automatic coding identified themes, sentiment, and word frequency for each case,
individually, and for all cases, collectively. Theme identification and sentiment analysis were
accomplished at the paragraph level. The word frequency query included stem words (e.g., talk,
talking, talked) with at least four characters.

4.5. Addressing researcher bias
To address the potential for bias in this study, we incorporated manual and automatic coding to
ascertain themes. We attempted to leave personal political bias out of this analysis by manually
coding items against a theoretical framework grounded in the crisis communication literature.
Concerning bias in the automatic coding, we assume that NVivo programmers did not introduce
bias into the software program through their coding practices that will affect the research findings.
In addition, the main author sought feedback and reviewed his findings with several peers. First
with the second author, who is a trained qualitative researcher specializing in the research
methodology of phenomenology. The second author reviewed the findings utilizing the bias
reduction technique of epoche. Schmitt (1968) described reducing bias through epoche as the
state of setting aside or bracketing out “prejudgments, biases, and preconceived ideas” (p. 59). The
first author also employed the use of an editor who reviewed the findings of the study for personal
or political bias as well as blatant coding errors.

4.6. Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework for the current study is as follows:
(1) By definition, a pandemic represents an existential crisis for humans. COVID-19 may have
come from the transfer of the coronavirus from a bat to a human in Wuhan, China.
(2) Effective mitigation of the global effects of pandemics rests on the crisis leadership and
communication used by political leaders to calm the public, define the threats, explain the
response, and keep the public updated.
(3) U.S. political leadership is sufficiently fragmented that public health norms have become
politicized. The U.S. election cycle further exacerbates issues. The politicization of the pan
demic response endangers the public and has cost lives.
(4) Effective leadership is essential; thus, it is crucial to examine how our political leaders are
leading the pandemic response.
(5) Political scholars typically use rhetorical, discourse, or narrative analysis
(6) Because COVID-19 has occurred during the U.S. presidential election cycle, contextual
factors appear to play a large part in how some politicians have shaped their response to
the pandemic (e.g., masks are mandatory, masks are not mandatory). Thus, political dis
course analysis is appropriate to investigate the phenomenon of presidential and guberna
torial leadership during the COVID-19 global pandemic.
(7) Political Discourse Analysis was used to analyze 239 transcripts from the press briefings of
President Trump and seven governors to determine the extent to which the research
subjects used effective crisis leadership and communication.
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Each leader’s style informs their response to COVID-19. Leadership style causes political beha
vior informed by the dynamics of style and context (Boin et al., 2010; Cairns, 2017), which informs
public perception. These items interact to create a real and perceived political vulnerability that
influences governance choices and policies (Boin et al., 2010). All of these dynamics interact to
affect the resilience of the overall system—the environmental, human, and national security; the
style, behavior, and public perception of the leader; and the political fallout and policies that result
(Stein, 2014). Figure 1 depicts how the conceptual framework relates concepts of leadership,
governance, and resilience.

5. Results
5.1. Auto-coded themes
NVivo automatically identified 43 common themes across all subjects; the top ten are listed in
Table 3. In aggregate, NVivo codes these themes in 14,376 locations within the 239 transcripts. No
theme occurred in every document.
Every node also contains subnodes, which provide additional context to the node. For example,
the node business contained 162 subnodes, with the most prominent being airline business,
business community, business owners, essential business, restaurant business, and small business
owners. Automatic subnode categorization does not take subtleties into account. Several business
subnodes are related to the same or similar concept of business owner, for example, (e.g., business
owner, small business owner, business people, small business men, small business folks). Also,

Figure 1. Conceptual frame
work relating leadership, gov
ernance, and resilience
theoretical frameworks.

Conceptual Framework Relating Leadership, Governance, and Resilience Theoretical Frameworks.

Leadership
Stylea
•Sensitivity to crisis context
•Need for information
•Need for control of crisis
response
•Personal involvement in
decision-making

Political
Vulnerabilitya
•Low, Mixed, or High
depending on the public
perception
•The leader's calculus of
vulnerability
•Advisors calculus of
vulnerability
•Public, opposition, and
formal inquiries

Political
Behaviora
•Delegate?
•Emphasize loyalty or
expertise?
•Appoint friends or experts?
•Stoke conflict or alignment
between advisors?
•Seek feedback and scan
environment?
•Consider and balance
alternatives?

Governance
Policiesb
•Participation and
collaboration
•Self-organization/ networks
•Learning and innovation
•Polycentric and multilayered
institutions

Public
Perceptiona
•Leader is hands-on and
engaged vs. detached and
univolved
•Leader is competent vs.
incompetent
•Leader is responsive vs.
unresponsive to needs
•Leader is decisive vs. slow or
tentative
•Leader is proactive vs.
reactive

Resilience
Capacityb
•Ability to resist state change
•Ability to absorb (buffering
capacity)
•Ability to accommodate
(flexibility)
•Ability to recover
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Table 4. Subnodes with 50 or more references
Name

Files

References

144

315

nursing homes

70

136

social distancing

81

121

physical distancing

41

108

hospital system

71

100

home order

53

97

right thing

69

96

healthcare system

57

81

healthcare workers

59

78

executive order

54

70

fantastic job

41

64

essential workers

41

64

antibody testing

41

62

infection rate

27

56

hospitalization rate

33

51

little bit

Table 3. Common themes coded across all subjects, sorted by references, then files
Name

Files

References

testing

181

857

workers

196

692

thing

181

647

hospital

181

613

state

183

581

health

177

581

people

191

557

system

173

545

good

177

513

numbers

168

433

under business subcodes, several industries are coded (e.g., airline, restaurant, cruise line). Table 4
shows all subnodes with at least 50 references.
Table 5 shows the number of automatically coded references for each node, by case. The cases
are in the same order as the previous Tables 5
Figure 2–9 show the nodes and references for each subject. These nodes are independent of the
nodes generated for subjects collectively.
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92

68

26

33

21

47

50

15

30

18

Business

Capacity

Care

Community

Day

Decision

Distancing

Economic

Facilities

Donald Trump

Bit

Common Theme

41

38

35

20

64

31

40

89

47

25

Andrew Cuomo

81

58

111

36

59

91

65

80

42

105

Gavin Newsom

60

15

17

7

11

30

55

29

19

33

Ron DeSantis

22

13

32

32

37

26

39

27

44

49

Mike DeWine

Table 5. Crosstabulation of the number of times common themes occurred for each subject

10

11

26

14

17

17

22

17

27

16

Gretchen
Whitmer

1

6

6

0

1

0

1

0

4

0

Kay Ivey

3

2

2

0

1

1

2

0

3

0

Doug Ducey
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Figure 2. Number of themes
automatically coded to Donald
Trump.
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Figure 3. Number of themes
automatically coded to Andrew
Cuomo.
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Figure 4. Number of themes
automatically coded to Gavin
Newsom.
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5.2. Manually coded themes
Four transcripts were selected for each subject as follows: (a) the first two chronologically, (b) midApril, and (c) the last before May 15. President Trump stopped attending coronavirus press brief
ings on 27 April 2020. Governors Ducey and Ivey had one and three transcripts, respectively.
We read each transcript twice to develop context and understanding of the interactions. We
then assigned words, phrases, sentences, or passages to the predetermined nodes from the
theoretical framework, starting with the earliest and working through the latest. Table 6 shows
the number of manual themes coded to the theoretical framework for each subject.

5.2.1. Leadership style
5.2.1.1. Need for information. Passages where the leader shared detailed information (n = 87)
were coded as having a high need for information (n = 87), and passages where the leader shared
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Figure 5. Number of themes
automatically coded to Ron
DeSantis.
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Table 6. Number of themes manually coded to the theoretical framework for each subject
Theme
DeSantis
DeWine

Ivey

Whitmer
Newsom

Ducey

Trump

Cuomo

High delegation

4

5

3

3

2

1

6

4

Low delegation

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Amount of
Delegation

Amount of Feedback and Environmental Scanning
Seeks feedback

10

11

7

4

8

0

5

4

Self-assured

6

1

2

0

0

0

27

1

Appoints experts

0

2

2

0

1

1

0

2

Appoints friends

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

0

Accepts
responsibility

0

5

7

11

17

3

3

3

Shifts
responsibility

1

3

0

3

0

0

20

3

Political Friends or
Experts

Blame

Conflict Between
Advisors
(Continued)
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Table 6. (Continued)
Theme
DeSantis
DeWine

Ivey

Whitmer
Newsom

Ducey

Trump

Cuomo

High conflict

0

0

0

1

0

0

11

0

Low conflict

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

Considering and Balancing Alternatives
Considers
alternatives

4

11

4

17

23

4

5

11

Single direction

2

4

0

0

0

1

12

3

Emphasis on Loyalty or Expertise
Emphasizes
expertise

1

12

9

8

14

7

11

9

Emphasizes
loyalty

2

0

0

0

0

0

15

0

High need

16

1

3

19

1

0

0

17

Low need

1

7

2

1

4

6

5

4

Need for Control

Need for Information
High need

14

5

12

19

17

0

0

18

Low need

6

17

1

2

0

3

15

5

Personal Involvement in Decision-Making
High involvement

12

1

9

14

12

3

2

7

Low involvement

0

4

0

0

0

0

2

0

Avoiding politics

4

3

1

10

24

0

9

8

Playing politics

2

0

0

6

0

0

25

13

Political play

brief or incomplete information as having a low need for information (n = 37). Governor Newsom,
on 19 March 2020, demonstrated a high need for information:
Newsom What we’re seeing not only on the ground, but we’re seeing through the data, is this
spread continues at a pace that we had anticipated in a number of our models. Let me
be precise. It’s a number that we have been using for the purposes of guiding our
resource delivery and guiding our decision-making. (Newsom, 2020a)
President Trump’s answer to a reporter’s question on 29 February 2020, illustrated a low need
for information. The president provides an equivocal answer prompting an intervention from Vice
President Pence, who directed the president’s attention to an expert who could answer the
question:

Reporter
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Figure 6. Number of themes
automatically coded to Mike
DeWine.

45
43
41
39
37
35
33
31
29
27
25
23
21
19
17
15
13
11
9
7
5
3
1
0

Trump
Reporter
Trump
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Trump
Pence
Trump
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As you know, the process of approving medicines is complex and time-consuming. What
powers
I think this process will go very quickly.
What powers will you use to speed it up?
I think Democrat, Republican, liberal, conservative—this process is going to go very
quickly.
The head of the FDA is on your right.
And, you know, that was—excuse me?
The head of the FDA is here, if you want to call on him.
Yeah. We can do that. You want to do that? (Trump, 2020b)

5.2.1.2. Need for control of crisis response. A high need for control (n = 56) or a low need for control
(n = 30) of crisis response was coded based on how much power or command the leader appeared
to demonstrate. Most of the subjects demonstrate both aspects at different times. Here, Governor
Cuomo demonstrates a high need for control of the pandemic response:
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Figure 7. Number of themes
automatically coded to
Gretchen Whitmer.
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Cuomo There will be no more gatherings of 50 plus people, so if you were hoping to plan a
graduation party, you can’t do it in the state of New York … .Gyms are closed, effective
8:00 PM tonight. I know that’s a specific hardship for the people in this room because I can
all see your masterful shape, buff even. There are other ways to exercise. Theaters closing
at 8:00 tonight until further notice. (Cuomo, 2020)
The following passage from Governor DeSantis illustrates a low need for control of the pandemic
response:

Reporter Why has the number of deaths been removed from the dashboard? I mean, it seems like
the dashboard is becoming less transparent. Can you address that?
DeSantis
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Figure 8. Number of themes
automatically coded to Kay
Ivey.
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I did not know that that was the case. I’ll ask them. I mean, I told them to put all the
data out. (DeSantis, 2020)

5.2.1.3. Personal involvement in decision-making. We coded high involvement in decision-making
(n = 60) or low involvement in decision-making (n = 6) based on how assertive the leader appeared
to be in making decisions or demonstrating direct or indirect involvement in a decision. Governor
Ivey demonstrated high involvement in decision-making in the following passage:
Ivey On March 13th, I originally issued guidelines, strongly urged recommendations, you might
say that if we all just did our part, then hopefully that would have been enough. At that time,
I spoke about my reluctance to issue a stay-at-home order because I’ve always known that if
the government kills a business, Washington can’t print enough money to bring it back to life.
(Ivey, 2020c)
The following passage illustrates President Trump deferring to Attorney General Barr:

Page 23 of 33

Watkins & Clevenger, Cogent Social Sciences (2021), 7: 1901365
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2021.1901365

Figure 9. Number of themes
automatically coded to Doug
Ducey.
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Trump Well, you’d have to ask Attorney General Barr, but I think he wants to see—like everybody,
he wants to see people get back and wants to see people get back to work. He doesn’t
want people to be held up when there’s no reason for doing it. (Trump, 2020b)

5.2.2. Political behavior
5.2.2.1. Amount of delegation. High delegation (n = 29) or low delegation (n = 0) was coded based
on whether leaders appeared to share responsibility for critical functions with advisors or whether
they seemed to take on those functions themselves. We did not find any examples of politicians
who demonstrated low delegation. Governor Ivey demonstrated high delegation in the following
passage:
Ivey I intend to take all of these suggestions and recommendations, and ask six members of my
coronavirus task force to help my administration begin to vet all of these good ideas. These
six individuals will serve on my executive committee, and they will work to put together a
thoughtful, well-planned timeline for us to open up the economy. (Ivey, 2020b)

5.2.2.2. Emphasis on loyalty or expertise. Passages where the leader appeared to highlight the
importance of falling in line were coded as emphasizes loyalty (n = 71) or referencing expert
opinion as emphasizes expertise (n = 9) in making decisions. The following passage from
Governor Ducey demonstrates an emphasis on expert opinion:
Ducey What I mentioned here today only touches on the surface is Dr. Anthony Fauci, with the
NIH, alluded to over the weekend. The social distancing measures we have implemented
are making an impact. We need everyone to keep it up, and I want to thank everyone for
their cooperation and responsible behavior. Next, I want to hand it over to Dr. Cara Christ
for a public health update, doctor. (Ducey, 2020)
The passages that emphasized loyalty were all attributed to Governor DeSantis or President
Trump. For example, here, the president emphasizes the loyalty of his supporters when armed
individuals protesting the mask mandate took over the Michigan Statehouse:

Reporter But would you urge those protesters to listen to local authorities?
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Figure 10. Research subjects
mapped to theoretical
framework.
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Trump I think they’re listening. I think they listen to me. They seem to be protesters that like me
and respect this opinion. And my opinion is the same as just about all of the governors.
(Trump, 2020a)

5.2.2.3. Appointment of political friends or experts. In some cases, leaders rely on political appoint
ments to run top jobs, codes as appoints friends (n = 4), while in others, leaders called on top
experts to help solve issues, coded as appoints experts (n = 8). There were eight examples of expert
appointments and four examples of friend appointments. The first passage demonstrates Governor
Ivey’s appointment of an infectious disease expert to her response team:
Ivey Dr. Harris is a widely respected specialist in infectious diseases, and goodness knows his
experience and his expertise are needed now more than ever. (Ivey, 2020a)
The following example demonstrates the appointment of friends to high places:

Trump Mike is really good at it. They’re going to work together. They’re going to work very closely
together. And they’re both in the administration. I see them all the time, so it really works.
This isn’t a czar. This isn’t going out and getting somebody that’s never been in the
administration. (Trump, 2020b)

5.2.2.4. Conflict or alignment between advisors. Passages were coded as demonstrating high
conflict between advisors (n = 8) demonstrating low conflict between advisors (n = 2). In the first
passage, Governor Ducey takes the stage from his expert so that he can refocus the conversation,
demonstrating low conflict and a desire for his advisor to stay on message:
Ducey I think what Dr. Chris is referring to is that the numbers are changing as we have more data
and information. We can fill in the blanks. So I know that you all want a prediction from my
myself or Dr. Chris. What we’re working on every day is to reduce the number of Arizonans
that can contract COVID-19. (Ducey, 2020)
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President Trump demonstrated high conflict with advisors in seven passages. For example, here
he seems to side with some governors over Dr. Fauci, a foremost expert in epidemiology:

Trump Well, that—it doesn’t really matter what they say there—and we just left him; we just had
a meeting—but—because we’re going to have much more than double it very soon. Now,
there are big believers in testing, and then there are some governors that don’t feel as
strongly about it at all. You understand that. They feel much differently about it. (Trump,
2020b)

5.2.2.5. Amount of feedback and environmental scanning. Passages were coded based on evi
dence that the leader seeks feedback and monitors the environment to help deal with COVID-19
(n = 49) or is self-assured and sticks with a singular plan (n = 26). Here, Governor Ivey demon
strated seeking feedback:
Ivey Like any good leader should, I have sought counsel for many avenues and received many,
many recommendations. In fact, these are just some of the many reports and suggestions
that we received in the last few days from the Small Business Commission to each member
of our congressional delegation in Washington. (Ivey, 2020c)
In this following example, President Trump sticks to his guns related to getting the economy
running at full tilt:

Trump Well, that’s not going to be normal … .Our normal is if you have 100,000 people in an
Alabama football game—or 110,000, to be exact—we want 110,000 people there. We
want every seat occupied. Normal is not going to be where you have a game with 50,000
people. (Trump, 2020a)

5.2.2.6. Considering and balancing alternatives. For considering and balancing alternatives, pas
sages were coded at considers alternatives if the leader seemed to be sharing a perspective that
came from balancing multiple alternatives (n = 80), or at single direction if the leader appeared to
be moving in a resolute direction without considering other points of view (n = 17). We coded the
following passage from Governor Newsom at balancing alternatives.
Newsom We always plan. We always anticipate. Let me give you some proof points. Today, we
just secured a very large hospital in Northern California, Seton. It’s now part of our
portfolio, and we’re going to populate that hospital as an example to meet the moment.
Tomorrow, we’ll announce a hospital in Southern California. (Newsom, 2020a)
In the following passage, Governor Ducey demonstrates his priority of keeping prisoners behind
bars and demonstrates an unwillingness to consider the alternative of releasing any prisoners.

Ducey Not only are we focused on protecting public health, we’re continuing to focus on protect
ing public safety, and we’re not going to be releasing any prisoners at this time. (Ducey,
2020)

5.2.2.7. Assigning blame. For assigning blame, passages were coded to accepting responsibility
(n = 49) or shifting responsibility (n = 28). Governor Newsom demonstrated accepting responsibility
17 times. For example:
Newsom The number one area of consternation that just a year and a half or so ago that I
highlighted was some of the borrowing from special funds and some of the deferrals into
new fiscal years that were done in the past … .I never imagined to be back a year later
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under these extraordinary circumstances … .That opportunity affords us about 19% in
solutions in this budget. (Newsom, 2020b)
President Trump shifted responsibility 20 times in the four interviews that we analyzed:

Trump They’re having—they’re suffering. This country wasn’t built on that principle; it was built on
an exact opposite principle, actually. And I watched, in one particular state, where they
were—they want to get back. They want to get back. They were very strict sanctions that
were put on people; that was probably the most strict of all. (Trump, 2020a)

5.2.2.8. Political play. Passages were coded under the theme avoiding politics where subjects
appeared to intentionally stay away from making a political statement (n = 57) versus playing
politics where subjects did choose to make a political statement (n = 43). Governor Newsom
seemed to go to a greater extent than most governors to avoid politics, as seen in the following
example:

Newsom Again, I just cannot express more appreciation for the collaborative spirit that has
defined this moment across agencies, across jurisdictions, across this country, into the
White House, the Pentagon, health and human service agencies across this country,
sharing best practices across state, and of course, the CDC and their leadership.
(Newsom, 2020a)
President Trump used a sharp political attack in his remarks to answer a reporter’s question
regarding Speaker Pelosi.

Trump Yeah, sure. Sure. I think Speaker Pelosi is incompetent. She lost the Congress once. I think
she’s going to lose it again. She lifted my poll numbers up 10 points. I never thought that I
would see that so quickly and so easily. I’m leading everybody. We’re doing great. (Trump,
2020b)

6. Discussion
Based on the automatic and manual coding, each subject appears to fit into the quadrants of the
theoretical framework. The findings were inconclusive concerning the amount of delegation. Each
of the governors delegated to experts, and President Trump delegated to experts and political
appointees. There was not enough information within the transcripts to make a judgment that the
amount of delegation was a determinant. However, we do infer that President Trump exercised
Low Control based on his decision to stop giving press briefings after April 27. Governors Ducey and
Ivey held few press briefings. However, Governor Ivey had significant evidence of environmental
scanning, seeking feedback, and personal involvement in decision-making. Governor DeWine
demonstrated a low need for information and low control. Therefore, we placed President
Trump, Governor DeWine, and Governor Ducey into Quadrant 4: Low Context and Low Control.
Governor DeSantis demonstrated a high need for control, mixed results concerning expertise vs.
loyalty, shifting of responsibility, and a propensity to ignore environmental feedback. Thus, we
placed Governor DeSantis into Quadrant 3: Low Context and High Control. Governor Ivey demon
strated a high need for information and mixed results on the need for control. Since she held only
three press briefings, we placed her in Quadrant 2: High Context and Low Control. Each of the other
Governors demonstrated that they sought feedback often, considered various alternatives, empha
sized expertise over loyalty, and had a high need to control the response. Therefore, Governors
Newsom, Cuomo, and Whitmer fit within Quadrant 1: High Context and High Control.
Figure 10 depicts the placement of the research subjects into the quadrants of the theoretical
framework. The mapping demonstrates that political discourse analysis provided insight into the
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Research Questions. These results suggest that Governors Trump, DeWine, and Ducey are vulner
able to political fallout and blame for their handling of COVID-19 because stakeholders might
perceive that their policies were ineffective and that they were detached and uninvolved. Governor
DeSantis might also be subject to blame unless people view his assertive actions as well-intended,
despite policy missteps. Governor Ivey might be vulnerable if people perceive her as detached and
uninvolved or slow to act. Governors Newsom, Cuomo, Whitmer may be in a better position to
avoid fallout due to their information-seeking hands-on approaches, which many will deem as
competent and appropriate to the threat. However, they still might be deemed as slow and
indecisive due to their high need for information.

6.1. Significance
This research demonstrated that discourse analysis of the press-briefings of political leaders could
predict their response patterns and the political fallout based on stakeholder perceptions. This
finding is important because politicians play a crucial leadership role in disaster response, resource
allocation, public perception, and the development of resilient systems.

6.2. Implications
The existential threat of the global pandemic presents an opportunity to consider presidential and
gubernatorial leadership from a systemic perspective. Political leadership is critical to creating
effective public policy responses that will save lives and use resources effectively (Masys, 2015;
Stein, 2014). Leaders at all levels must work together to form a coordinated, effective crisis
response (Fineberg, 2014; Gasper, 2014; Reynolds & Quinn, 2008). The current research demon
strates the importance of leadership style on crisis communication and the implications for
political fallout. Within the theoretical framework presented here, each leadership style is at risk
of some level of fallout. However, low context or low control approaches predict more potential for
blame (Boin et al., 2010).
Based on political discourse analysis, we placed the three Democratic governors into Quadrant 1
because they demonstrated high context and high control leadership styles. We placed the other
subjects into Quadrants 2, 3, and 4 with respect to their leadership styles. President Trump and the
Republican governors each exhibited either low context or low control or both.
President Trump’s low context, low control style repeatedly placed him at odds with coronavirus
taskforce experts in terms of his stance on wearing masks, social distancing, opening schools, and
the speed of opening various sectors of the economy. Previous pandemics demonstrated that
opening too soon results in higher transmission and more deaths (Fineberg, 2014; Gostin et al.,
2016; Hashim et al., 2012; Liang et al., 2018; Thomas & Young, 2011). The implications of opening
too fast are more long-term health issues and more deaths. Consequently, if President Trump’s
leadership style influenced others to follow his lead, despite their instincts or preferred style, then
more people are at risk of contracting the virus.

7. Limitations
The researchers were unable to use measures of intercoder reliability due to time and resource
constraints. Manual coding presents the opportunity to apply bias as words carry subjective
meaning based on the lens. We attempted to reduce bias through the careful application of the
theoretical framework and approaches mentioned in the method section. One researcher accom
plished the coding tasks, and another researcher reviewed the coding for content and bias. We
also engaged a communications expert to review the draft and final manuscripts for evidence of
bias.
Second, due to time constraints, a subset of the transcripts (28 of 239) was coded manually.
Coding more transcripts might have resulted in more robust or different findings. It is unclear if
President Trump or the selected governors changed their crisis communication as the pandemic
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proceeded. Extending the timeframe of the study to include additional phases of the pandemic or
the runup to the U.S. election might yield different results, and we suggest further study.
Third, we sourced transcripts of the gubernatorial press briefing from a third-party site. Some
briefings may have been missing or incomplete, which might have affected the results, especially
for Governors Ducey and Ivey. We believe these limitations have not impacted the findings and
that the method systematically addressed these concerns by relying on multiple perspectives and
research-based frameworks.

7.1. Suggestions for future research
The current study looked at President Trump and a small sample of U.S. governors. Extending this
research to encompass the U.S. Congress, U.S. state governments, territories, tribal nations, and
local politicians would provide more insight into political crisis leadership. There may be different
phases of the crisis where different leadership styles are more effective or more appropriate.
It would be informative to study if presidential leadership style and party affiliation moderate
the governors’ communication styles. For example, Governor DeSantis appeared with President
Trump in one press briefing. He may have changed his message to stay in line with President
Trump’s message. It is possible that the Republican governors suppressed information in their
press conferences because they did not want to contradict the president’s statement. It is also
possible that the Democratic governors amplified their context and control styles to separate
themselves from the president. President Trump harnessed Twitter as his primary communica
tion channel. In the current research, we reviewed press briefings against the theoretical
framework. It would be informative to analyze political discourse delivered through social
media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok). Social media would present a much different
perspective of political discourse to different audiences.
Finally, we conducted this research during the first four months of a global pandemic. Extending
the time horizon to include the entirety of the pandemic could help refine lessons learned. It will
be possible to map some leaders’ behaviors to outcomes such as flattening the curve, hospitaliza
tion rates, peak contraction rates, and mortality rates.

8. Conclusion
This research demonstrated that discourse analysis of political leaders’ press-briefings could
predict their response patterns and how blame might be assigned based on stakeholder
perceptions. The researchers analyzed COVID-19 press briefings of President Trump and
seven U.S. governors using a theoretical framework based on the work of Boin et al. (2010).
The framework is intended to demonstrate how leadership style affects crisis behavior and
communication, thus predicting how blame might fall either during low moments of the crisis
or once the crisis is over and the public begins to evaluate the responses.
Based on a political discourse analysis of 28 press briefings, we placed Governors Cuomo,
Newsom, and Whitmer into Quadrant 1 (high context, high control) because they demonstrated
high context and high control leadership styles. We placed Governor Ivey into Quadrant 2 (high
context, low control), Governor DeSantis into Quadrant 3 (low context, high control), and President
Trump and Governors DeWine and Ducey into Quadrant 4 (low context, low control) with respect to
their leadership styles.
This research demonstrated the importance of leadership style on crisis communication. Within
the theoretical framework presented here, each leadership style is at risk of some level of fallout.
However, low context or low control approaches predict more potential for blame (Boin et al.,
2010).
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